Blockchain-based secure multi-resource trading model for smart marketplace by Yakubu, Bello Musa et al.
Aberystwyth University
Blockchain-based secure multi-resource trading model for smart marketplace







Citation for published version (APA):
Yakubu, B. M., Khan, M. I., Javaid, N., & Khan, A. (2021). Blockchain-based secure multi-resource trading




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 30. Aug. 2021
Computing (2021) 103:379–400
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00607-020-00886-7
SPEC IAL ISSUE ART ICLE
Blockchain-based secure multi-resource trading model for
smart marketplace
Bello Musa Yakubu1 ·Majid I. Khan1 · Nadeem Javaid1 · Abid Khan2
Received: 14 September 2020 / Accepted: 1 December 2020 / Published online: 11 January 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, AT part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
Developments in sensors and communication technology lead to the emergence of
smart communities where diverse collaborative applications can be enabled. One such
application is the Smart Market Place (SMP), where participants of the smart com-
munity can trade resources, such as energy, internet bandwidth, water, etc., using a
virtual currency (such as ether). However, most of the existing SMP trading models
are proposed to trade a single resource and also restrict a participant to perform only a
single transaction at a time. Restriction on multiple parallel transactions is imposed to
protect the participants against the double-spending attack in the SMP. This work pro-
poses a secure multi-resource trading (SMRT) model that is based on public Ethereum
blockchain. SMRT allows participant of a SMP to trade multiple resources and initi-
ate parallel transactions. Moreover, detailed security analysis and adversary model are
presented to test the effectiveness and to assess the resilience of the proposed model
against the double-spending attack. The adversary model is based on partial progress
towards block production which is influenced by time advantage and average com-
puting power. Furthermore, simulation based analysis and comparison of SMRT is
also presented in terms of security, performance, cost and latency of transactions. It is
observed that SMRT not only provides protection against the double spending attack,
but it also reduces the computational overhead of the proposed model up to 50% as
compared to existing trading models.
Keywords Blockchain technology · Smart marketplace · Multi-resource trading ·
Double-spending attack
Mathematics Subject Classification 68M25 · 68P27
1 Introduction
Advancements in sensor integrated devices and network innovations has led to the
emergence of smart communities where resources, such as energy, water, and internet
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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bandwidth can be traded among the participating entities for example local energy
smart grid (LESM) system and community water supply cooperation (CWSC), this
type of trading platform is named as Smart Market Place (SMP) [1,2]. Depending on
the architecture, existing SMP solutions can be categorized into two types, centralized
and decentralized. The centralized approach is based on a traditional contemporary
model, where the system provides a central control for processing, administering, and
delivering resource trades [3]. The approach has some benefits for example, ease of
set-up and flexible overall system control. However, it may face a range of privacy and
security problems, such as central point of failure, controller compromise, and infor-
mation leakage [4]. Alternatively, distributed approach enables resource management
and exchange among the participants with either fully or semi-distributedmechanisms
[5,6]. Using the distributed approach, a participant can obtain required resources from
its neighborhood without or partially relying on a central resource trading manager
[7]. In distributed approach, household owners with surplus resources achieve greater
profits compared to the centralized scheme, because it enables participants to express
and settle resource prices, thus establishing a competitive resource trading market
[6,8]. Additionally, the distributed approaches help to overcome the limitations of
centralized approaches, such as central point of failure and high influence of central
authorities in terms of control and management [5].
Most of the existing SMP solutions are decentralized in nature (implemented using
blockchain technology, such as Ethereum) and allow only one type of resource to be
traded (for example, energy or water) [9,10]. Moreover, a participant can trade with
only one other participant at a given time, that is, it is not permitted for a seller to trade
with two or more buyers in parallel. For example, [11,12] introduce trading models to
enable data/internet bandwidth trading, and [4,13] are solemnly presented to enable
energy trading, only allowing one trading transaction at a time. We refer to these types
of trading platform as one-to-one single resource type (OTOSRT) approaches. These
type of approaches are established to ensure transparency and to avoid double spending
behaviours by participants during the trading activities. As a result, existing SMP
models are not applicable in scenarios where a seller wants to divide a large quantity
of resources into small portions and publish it to multiple buyers to sell in parallel.
Moreover, a seller may desire to trade different types of resources, such as energy,
water, and internet bandwidth. We refer such a scenario as one-to-many multiple
resource type (OTMMRT) trading model that needs to be developed. Moreover, the
OTMMRT facility in SMP can be exploited by the adversary to launch a double
spending attack, that needs to be addressed. Two types of double spending attacks
for these scenarios are, token based double spending, and ownership based double
spending [4,14]. In token based double spending, the attacker is an authenticated
requester node who wants to spend a single digital token more than once in several
trading transactions. While, in ownership based double spending, the attacker is an
authenticated provider node who wants to sell ownership of a resource (e.g. Energy)
to two or more buyers.
Considering the significance for achieving scalable and secured resource trading,
the need for OTMMRT trading model is evident. In this paper, we present a novel
OTMMRT trading model with low overhead and latency that also provides protection
from double-spending attacks.
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Our contributions Following contributions are made in this paper:
• a scalable OTMMRT trading scheme is proposed. It enables a participant to per-
form multi-resource trading with one or more participants simultaneously,
• a security feature to handle ownership based double spending attack together with
a token based double spending attack in SMP had been proposed,
• the smart contract architecture was built, tested, and carefully evaluated to ensure
that there are adequate flexibility and defense against severe security threats, such
as re-entrancy vulnerability, timestamp dependency, transaction dependency and
parity multisig bug,
• detailed security analysis was carried out to show that the SMRT scheme is pro-
tected against specified adversary model. Experiments had been performed to
compare the effectiveness of the SMRT model compared to existing schemes.
Organization of the paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides
an overview of the related work. In Sect. 3, we present the system model, Sect. 4
describes SMRT trading scheme. Section 5 discusses the security analysis, Sect. 6
explains the testing and evaluation, and Sect. 7 is the conclusion.
2 Related work
Most of the existing SMPs are designed for OTOSRT [11,12]. This is to curtails
double spending attacks which may be inevitable [15]. However, there are very few
schemes such as [4] that allow trading a single resource with two or more participants
in parallel. Yet, these techniques face many challenges when it comes to deployment
in a real world scenario, such as identity and privacy issues, and double spending
attacks. Similarly, technique proposed in [16] is developed for OTOSRT, but it can be
used to trade various resource types (e.g. energy, water etc.) during different trading
periods.
The existing trading schemes can also be categorised based on their architectures
that is centralized, semi-distributed, or fully distributed [15]. Initially, some of the
schemes uses centralized contemporary architecture [1,3] when determining how and
when to charge a customer based on token payment approach. The resulting impreci-
sion, may not be acceptable in the event of higher and less regular payments. This may
be as a result of the control center for processing, managing and distributing resources
and token payment transactions. The approach has several benefits, e.g. easy set-up
and efficient management; yet, it still poses wide range of privacy and security issues
similar to several other centralized approaches [1,4].
The token based payment system can be used not only in conventional centralized
client trading schemes, but also in semi-distributed P2P platforms [17,18]. The concept
of private SMPP2P trading andpaymentwas proposed in [16,18], the approach ensures
that communications and transactions remain private. This original concept demanded
an on-line manager to confirm tokens before vendors could provide their services
to protect them from double spending. Technique [19,20] uses digital tokens as a
payment mechanism for P2P transactions, taking advantage of the fact that peers are
clients and traders at the same time. Buyers will then pay with the (exchangeable)
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tokens they receive from selling their own goods, reducing the amount of contacts
with the central authority. Similarly, the scheme [21,22] broadens the concept of [19]
and guarantees that tokens are anonymous as well as the responsibility of assigning
authority to peers themselves. In addition, technique [21] proposes a method for real-
time double spending detection that uses the P2P network as a semi-decentralized
database for spent tokens and queries using a DHT routing layer such as [23]. Besides,
techniques [1,24–26] addresses the same concept in more detail and tests various
situations for the position of collected, spent tokens.Yet, neither solution could provide
tough assurances against double spending, particularlywhen a portion of the P2Pnodes
are compromised [27]. The semi-decentralized database cannot be completely trusted
except if the secure routing and integrity of peers is assured and can only accommodate
probabilistic assurances.
Notwithstanding, better solution for token-based payment resource trading can
be achieved using full decentralized/distributed P2P platforms, such as blockchain
technology [1,15]. The approach [13] introduced a mechanism known as the Commit
to Pay (CTP) to tackle double spending based on blockchain with the help of Merkle
Tree [28]. It is a payment agreement that commits a sum of tokens to the seller.
Under this process, the buyer will not be able to spend the money deposited, and the
deposited money will not be transferred to the producer’s account until the products
are released else, the token will be reversed back to the buyer after a given time frame.
Another untraceable blockchain token-based payment system was implemented in
[4]. The technique also explored the idea of Bitmessage technology [29]. Besides,
the technique prevents an attacker from spending more than one digital token or
ownership of generated commodities. Thus, approaches [4,13] demonstrate unique
and better techniques towards curtailing double spending attack in the SMPmore than
other existing approaches mentioned above. Nevertheless, the approaches [4,13] are
only applicable in single resource trading and may not support multiple transactions at
a time in a multi-party SMP. Furthermore, they may be prone to Blockchain analysis
attack and the implementation of Merkle Tree in a Blockchain-based network such
as Ethereum network may be computationally cost which can also lead to slow flow
of transactions. This might make the process to become less efficient and less user-
friendly. However, based on contextual and practical similarities, [4,13] are set as the
benchmark techniques to our proposed approach.
In conclusion, almost all the existing literature only focused on OTOSRT resource
trading. These approaches are not well-suited for simultaneous multi-resource trading
in amulti-user SMPenvironment due to the possibility of double spending attack.Thus,
there is a need to come up with more scalable lightweight cryptographic solutions that
support multiple resource trading. Table 1 provides the summary of the most current
related approaches in the literature.
3 Systemmodel
This section provides a detailed discussion on our system model, which include; (1)
network model, (2) adversary model, (3) security and operational requirements, and
(4) requirements for security failure of our proposed framework.
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3.1 Networkmodel
In this work, the SMP (inspired by [30]) comprises of smart homes, equipped with
smart gateway hardware (e.g. smart meters) that are connected to the internet, as
shown in Fig. 1. Legitimate smart homes in the SMP are identified by their respective
smart gateways and can take part in the P2P resource trading either as a resource
provider (Seller) or resource requester (Buyer). They initially purchase their individual
resources from their respective resource provider (RP) for example internet service
provider, water supply company, and energy grid. Later on, participants (Sellers) sell
their excess resources to other participants (Buyers) who need extra resources in the
community. It is presumed that both the buyer and seller of a given resource must be
subscribers of the same RP.
The SMP network is based on semi-centralized private Ethereum blockchain tech-
nology with a self-triggering program called smart contract [9,10,14]. Besides, the
SMP is a private digital trading environment were all participating stakeholders per-
form trading activities based on proof-of-authority (PoA) consensus algorithm [6]. In
PoA consensus algorithm, a miner node is selected based on its identity; and authority
(power) is given to it to verify and allow any transaction to be added to the block. The
SMP as a whole, is equipped with a temper-proofed virtual management point referred
here as the Smart Market Gateway (SmGW), as shown in Fig. 1. Both the smart homes
and SmGW have access to smart contracts and use separate Ethereum Account (EA).
The SMP is presumed to have a set of registered and recognized RPs and smart homes
in the network is the subscriber of the RP. The RPs provide the needed resources (such
as water, electricity, and internet bandwidth) to all participating smart homes. The
model is inspired and based on the Bitmessage method of decentralized P2P message
authentication and delivery.
3.2 Adversary model
We make the following preliminary assumptions about adversary:
• an adversary may control the means of communication between participants in
SMP and then launch double spending attack,
• the SmGW and other smart gateways are temper proof and therefore cannot be
compromised.
Motivated by [14], the concept of an attack in this work, is justified on the basis
of the following parameters; (i) adversary’s likelihood of making a double spending
attack (DS), (ii) a potential progress function (P) and (iii) a catch-up function (C). The
parameter DS relies on P and C; and intuitively tests the network’s susceptibility to
a double spending attack. P describes the anticipated adversary branch length after a
valid branch has been sufficiently long. While C describes a double-spending attack
likelihood by considering the anticipated length of the adversary’s branch. Following
are the definitions of the parameters that are used to describe the adversary model:
• q ∈ [0, 1]: is the probability that an adversary will be able to mine a block faster
than the trustworthy nodes once they start to mine simultaneously. This implies
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Fig. 1 Proposed system model
that q is the ratio of the adversary’s computing strength compared to total network
computing capacity.
• The minimum number of verified block confirmations and transactions needed for
acceptance set by each seller or buyer (as the case may be) is given as: K .
• The average amount of time in seconds required to mine a block for the entire
network (both for trustworthy and adversary nodes) is given as: τ ∈ IR> 0
Main goal of the model is to analyze the output of parameterDS in relation to other
parameters as follows:
• DS(q, K , n, t) is the likelihood that the adversarywill effectively execute a double-
spending attack, provided that the adversary node dominates q percent of the
system, given an initial benefit of n blocks and t seconds over trustworthy nodes,
and only the K th block has been mined.
• P(q,m, n, t) is the likelihood that the adversary would precisely mine n blocks
after the mining of anmth block by trustworthy nodes.While, t is the time at which
an adversary node mines the nth block precisely.
• C(q, t) is the probability that an adversary’s branch will be longer than a trust-
worthy one, if trustworthy nodes were to mine their final blocks t seconds earlier
than adversary.
In our attack scheme, states are recognized via the size of legitimate and bogus
branches, that are presumed to have the same size, as well as the time gap during
which all trustworthy and adversary nodes have mined their last block. In other words,
a state comprises of two quantities t and n indicating the time gap t during which both
the trustworthy and the adversary nodes mined their nth blocks. Hence, the possibility
of double spending attack occurrence in this work is measured based on the ability of
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the adversary to mine a block of transactions faster than the trustworthy nodes within
a specified practical time advantage as suggested in [14].
3.3 Security and operational requirements
The proposed framework is intended to satisfy the following security and operational
criteria:
• Authentication The proposed framework should allow only verified-registered and
authorized smart homes of the SMP to participate in the resource trading.
• Double-spending It should be able to provide protection from the two identified
double spending attacks. These include; Token based double spending and Own-
ership based double spending.
• Multi-party SMP The system should be able to allow a participant to trade with
other multiple participants in the SMP simultaneously.
• Multi-resource trading The framework should allow a participant to trade multiple
resources concurrently.
4 Securemulti-resource tradingmodel (SMRT)
This section presents the proposed SMRT trading model as presented in Fig. 2. Four
main actors involved in this model are: the requester gateway (ReqGW), provider
gateway (ProGW), the smart market gateway (SmGW), and the RP. Others include the
auction board, the blockchain handler and the payment handler smart contract (PHSC).
The scheme is proposed to be implemented in three phases, namely: registration,
initialization and message transmission.
4.1 Registration of smart homes in the SMP
The SmGW registers all participating smart homes, and add them to the SMP. In
this respect, the joining smart home will need to send a joining request transaction
(containing its credentials) to the SmGW , which comprises of the smart gateway’s
public key, RPIDN (resource provider identification number) and block Timestamp.
The SmGW will verify if the RPIDN belongs to valid RP in the SMP and then evaluate
the freshness of the Timestamp as described in Eq. (1). The Timestamp freshness
verification is done by checking if the current timestamp is greater than that of the
received transaction message. If the results are true, then the smart home is added to
the SMP and a reply with a new shared key called Transaction session key (TSKey)
encrypted with the public key of the smart home is transmitted. After receiving this
key, the smart home gateway using its public and private keys creates new pairs of
session IDs called marketing session IDs (MSIDpub,MSIDprv). All keys and IDs are
for one-time usage. Therefore, for subsequent trading cycles, new keys and IDs are
generated using public and private keys.
Each pair of Marketing session IDs are created using the Bitmessage technique,
which allow every participating node (smart home) to create IDs and broadcast
123
Blockchain-based secure multi-resource trading model… 387
Fig. 2 Proposed trading model
encrypted transaction messages anonymously. However, the Bitmessage technique
encrypts each block of transactions independently instead of using an encryption
method which mostly makes the contents of the encrypted blocks dependent on each
other. With this Bitmessage feature, the attacker can rearrange blocks of the encrypted
transactionmessageswhich the receiver will see as a validmessage, allowing blocks of
the message to arrive in the order chosen by the attacker [31]. To address the message
arrival problem, we adopt cryptographic proof-of-authority (PoA) and speedup RSA
encryption/decryption [32] schemes in the system during implementation to ensure
security and privacy are maintained within the private network.
curr.Timestamp > Timestamp (1)
4.2 Initialization
The initialization steps required for a transaction among the trading partners (ProGW
andReqGW ) are discussed in this section. Following the smart homes registration in the
SMP, the potential ProGW submit its tender of resources T (R) and itsMSIDProGWPub
first to the respective RPs for resource ownership key generation. The T (R) is given as
{R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rn}, where n is the cardinality of the resource types, if the ProGW
have subscriptions with n RPs and willing to make trading of n resources in the SMP
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Fig. 3 Initializing the trading process
as described in Eq. (2).
T (R1) = ap1, rR1 , bp2, rR1 , cp3, rR1 , . . . , zpx , rR1
T (R2) = ap1, rR2 , bp2, rR2 , cp3, rR2 , . . . , zpx , rR2
T (R3) = ap1, rR3 , bp2, rR3 , cp3, rR3 , . . . , zpx , rR3
...
T (Rn) = ap1, rRn , bp2, rRn , cp3, rRn , . . . , zpx , rRn (2)
Where a, b, c, and z are positive real numbers representing the volumes (amounts)
of resource type needed, p and r are the price and unit of the resource types
R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rn respectively.
Then each RP verify the request and the availability of the said resource. Each
RP then replies with a secrete ownership key (OKeyProGw), a nonce, and the block
timestamp to the ProGW . Besides, a lock is also activated by the concerned RP on the
said amount of the requested resource; this ensures that the resource cannot be used by
ProGW ’s smart home after the ownership key is generated. The RP reply is described
in Eq. (3) and line 10 and 19 of Algorithm 1.
Tx(ProGW)←RP
= {(OKeyProGwR1 ,NonceR1), . . . , (OKeyProGwRn ,NonceRn )}
(3)
Secondly, on receiving the ownership key(s), the ProGW submit a selling partic-
ipation request to the SmGW which is made up of its MSIDProGWPub , T (R) and the
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block timestamp encrypted with its TSKey. In return, the SmGW receives and decrypt
the message, evaluate it as described in Eq. (1) and then updates the blockchain pub-
lic ledger. Also, during this evaluation, the SmGW also verifies the validity of the
submitted T (R) from the concerned RP. If the evaluation results turned to be true,
the SmGW replies with a trade granting permission (TGP) message as depicted in
Fig. 3. On receiving the TGP message, the ProGW broadcast its bids anonymously
on the blockchain auction board as given in Eq. (4), which also includes the price
of the resource to be sold. The broadcast processes are also depicted as an output of
Algorithm 1.
Txauctionboard←ProGW = MSIDProGwPub ‖ Type ‖
Volume ‖ Price ‖ Timestamp ‖ Nonce ‖ Unit (4)
The pair of ID, Nonce and OKeyProGw together are used only for one-time trading
cycle. Similarly, the pair of IDs andOKeyProGw are also used to prevent double spend-
ing from the side of ProGW . While nonce is used to verify the identity and ownership
claim of ProGW on the said resources. In addition, the OKeyProGw is used to sell or
transfer ownership of the resource locked by this secret key to the buyer. Bids are
broadcasted to all nodes in the private blockchain network.
The ReqGW , being the potential resource buyer submits a buying participation
request to the SmGW which is made up of itsMSIDReqGwPub , and the block timestamp
encrypted with its TSKey as described in line 2 of Algorithm 2. In return, the SmGW
receives and decrypt the message, evaluate it as described in Eq. (1) and then updates
the blockchain public ledger. If the evaluation result turn out to be true, SmGW replies
with a new trade granting permission (TGP) message. This will enable the ReGW
to receive broadcasted bids from the auction board. The initialization processes are
highlighted in Fig. 3.
4.3 Transactional message block (TMB) transmission
A ReqGW obtains a given ProGW ’s MSID and other information about the bid from
the auction board. Since there may be several suppliers, therefore the ReqGW filters
result by activating a matching process according to price and amount. To do so, the
auction handler searches the blockchain for recent transactions aimed at a given public
key by verifying the freshness of the Timestamp as described in Eq. (1) and line 5–13
of Algorithm 2. The ReqGW then obtain the records of active bids and messaging
stream Marketing Session IDs of supplier relevant to its query.
If the ReqGW selects the ProGW as a potential supplier, it sends a private message
to SmGW asking to verify the ProGW ’s claim of ownership. This is to re-ensure that
authenticity and legitimacy are maintained at this level. From Fig. 4, The SmGW
scans blockchain public ledger and responds if the argument is true or false (Line
4–13, Algorithm 2). If the claim is true, then the auction panel is utilized for bid
selection and private messages are sent to negotiate with a potential supplier (ProGW )
by encrypting the TMB using the MSIDProGWPub as:
MSIDProGWPub(MSIDReqGWPub , ωi , Ti ) = φi (5)
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Algorithm 1: : Provider Gateway (ProGW) resource submission and initialization
Input: Read the value: MSI DpubProGW ←hash(PubKeyProGw, T imestamp2)
Output:
Broadcast Bidding←MSI DPubProGW ‖T ypei‖Volumei‖Pricei‖T imestampi‖Noncei‖Uniti
1 Function SubmitTender(T(R)):
2 n ←Number of resources
3 if (n = 1) then
4 R ← Type of resource;
5 a ← Amount of resource;
6 p ← Price of resource;
7 r ← Unit of resource;
8 T (R) ← (a, p, r);
9 T ender .Submit←(T (R), MSI DPubProGW , T imestamp);
10 RP.Reply ← (OKeyProGw, Nonce).
11 else
12 for (i = 0; i <= n; i + +) do
13 Ri ← Type of resourcei ;
14 bi ← Amount of resourcei ;
15 pi ← Price of resourcei ;
16 ri ← Unit of resourcei ;
17 T (Ri ) ← (bi , pi , ri );
18 T ender .Submit←(T (Ri ), MSI DPubProGW , T imestamp);
19 RP.Reply ← (OKeyProGw, Nonce).
20 end
21 end
where ωi is the request message and Ti is the block timestamp. The ReqGW identity
remains anonymous behind a pseudonym MSIDReqGWPub .
A validating authority validates the TMB and adds it to the blockchain based on
PoA consensus algorithm.With this, the encrypted TMB is published in the blockchain
network where all participant nodes will receive a copy of the package. Only ProGW
which has the right secret key will be able to decrypt the TMB using aMSIDProGwPrv ,
as follows:
MSIDProGwPrvφi = ωi , Ti ,MSIDReqGwPub (6)
and then ProGW verifies the freshness of Ti using Eq. (1). If it verifies to be true, then
some response should be returned to the ReqGW by encrypting another TMB:
MSIDReqGwPubω, Tj = ω j (7)
Similar checks will be performed by ReqGW to verify the message sent by ProGW .
As depicted in Fig. 4 and lines 15–21 of Algorithm 2, after all sides agreed on the
negotiation, then ReqGW trigger a payment handler smart contract (PHSC) and then
submit the payment via the PHSC in the form of encrypted anonymousmessage stream
transaction as demonstrated in the Eq. (8). A commit to pay notification transaction
will be broadcasted by PHSC to inform the nodes about the commitment of theReqGW
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Fig. 4 Trading process conclusion
as depicted in Eq. (9).
TxProGW←ReqGW
= MSIDProGwPub(MSIDReqGwPub ,Type,Volume,Unit,Token,Ti )
(8)
Tx(ProGW)←PHSC
= TID ‖ Timestamp ‖ t ′ ‖ Price ‖ ContractHash ‖ MSIDReqGwPub
(9)
Where TID is the transaction ID, t ′ is the maximumwaiting time, Price is the agreed
price of the commodity,ContractHash is the hash of the smart contract,MSIDReqGwPub
is the public pair of the ReqGW ’s marketing session ID and Timestamp is the block
timestamp.
This will enable the ProGW to re-confirm its willingness to sell itsOkey of the said
resource before the PHSC could allow the payment to reach the respective ProGW .
As per our PHSC rule, payment can only be released when the PHSC confirms the
receipt of the appropriate Okey. The same rule applies before Okey could be allowed
to reach the respective ReqGW .
After seeing the commit payment notification from the PHSC, the ProGW then
encrypts its OKeyProGw and submit it to the ReqGW anonymously via the PHSC
within the waiting time t :
Tx = MSIDReqGwPub(OKeyProGw) (10)
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Algorithm 2: : Requester gateway buying transactions and negotiations
Input: Read the value: MSI DpubReqGW ←hash(PubKeyReqGW , T imestamp4)
Output: OKeyProGW , Payment
1 Function BuyingTransact(BT):
2 buyingRequest ← hash(MSI DpubReqGW , T imestamp)
3 ReqGW .Local Reposi tory ← Broadcast Bidding
4 Function Auction_Check(AC):
5 if (curr .T imestamp > T imestamp) then
6 if Noncei , I Di , OKeyi ∈ ProGWi then
7 Return : Send for Negotiation
8 else
9 Return : Claim not Valid!
10 end
11 else
12 Return : Auction freshness not confirmed!
13 end
14 Function Negotiations(NG):
15 if (Pricei = Accept) then
16 Return : Negotiation successful!
17 Trigger PHSC
18 PHSC ← ReqGW .Payment
19 ProGW ← PHSC .Commit Pay
20 PHSC ← ProGW .OKeyProGW
21 ProGW ← Payment
22 ReqGW ← OKeyProGW
23 ...................
24 ProGW ← SmGW .CreditCon f irm
25 ReqGW ← SmGW .Certi f icate
26 else
27 Return : Auction negotiation discarded!
28 end
The PHSC credits the ProGW ’s account with the said Tokens and then prompts the
SmGW to sends twomessages. Thefirstmessage is a certificationmessage submitted to
ReqGW . The message includes the OKeyProGW and ContractHash encrypted with the
ReqGW ’s shared TSKey. The second message is credit confirmation message which
includes the amount of the Token credited, and the ContractHash. The message is
submitted to ProGW encrypted with ProGW ’s shared TSKey.
However, the ProGW can simply ignore the commit payment notification without
replying with its Okey if the seller no longer intends to sell the ownership key. Thus,
after the period t ≥ t ′ is achieved, then the PHSC will refund the ReqGW and then
prompt the SmGW to send a transaction cancellation notification to the ProGW . The
SmGW also sends another message to ProGW to confirm if it wants to withdraw its
bids from the SMP. If the ProGW confirm yes, then all its bids will be dismissed
from the auction board and a trading withdrawal notification will be submitted to the
ProGW . Else, the bids will remain available to the buyers.
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5 Security analysis
The goal of this section is to demonstrate that the proposedmodel is protected under the
given adversary model. Theorems 1 and 3 are for ownership based double-spending,
while Theorem 2 is applied to token based double spending. Similarly, the security
analysis is proven to be effective under practical time advantage and average computing
power. This is to say that, the solution is effective within the assumed time benefit
given to an adversary that has average processing power over the trustworthy nodes.
Below are the main security assessments.
Theorem 1 The system is immune to a malicious ProGW who intend to use-up or not
to deliver resource(s) to the ReqGW after receiving payment.
Proof After resourceOkey request submission to the concerned RP, the RP verifies and
activates a lock on the said resource amount. This will make the ProGW to temporary
lost control of the resource as soon as he receives the Okey of the said resource.
Besides, the payment will be confirmed after the ProGW released its Okey within a
given waiting time t . This is to prevent the malicious ProGW from intending to use
or not to release the purchased resource after receiving his payment. Furthermore, the
ProGW loses complete control of the resources as soon as he releases hisOkey within
the given waiting time t and the payment will be confirmed after. The payment is given
as:
ProGWpayment = PHSC(OKeyProGW ) · t ≤ t ′ (11)
The payment is reversed to the payer and the transaction void if t ≥ t ′, where t ′ is
the maximumwaiting time. This is ensured by the PHSC. ProGW may withdraw from
the market and gain full custodial control of his remaining resources (if applicable)
after the system confirms and balances all pending transactions. 	
Theorem 2 A malicious consumer (ReqGW) cannot receive any resources locked by
relevant Okey without paying the respective producer (ProGW) nor can he spend
digital token more than one time in the system.
Proof Even if the malicious ReqGW intend to compromise the agreed deal by not
paying the requested fee, the PHSC will not allow the passage of the ProGW ’s Okey
until it confirms the release of the agreed fund from the concerned ReqGW . The
ownership key release is given as:
ReqGWrelease = PHSC(TokenReqGW ) · t ≤ t ′ (12)
The order is reversed to the seller and the transaction void if t ≥ t ′. In addition, the
proposed model imposes a principle that only previously unused transaction outputs
can be used as inputs for new transactions. A validating authority node verifies this
principle while disseminating transactions by traversing and tracking the whole of
their local blockchain copy. 	
Theorem 3 The system can prevent attacker to spend ownership over submitted ten-
der of resources more than one time within practical time advantage and average
computing power.
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Proof To prevent double spending on resource tender T (R) ownership, the RP “locks”
T (R) with a unique ownership secret key OKeyProGw, and reply with a copy of the
key to the ProGW . These processes are carried out after the tender is received by
the RP. However, when the ProGW submit a selling request, the SmGW contact the
concerned RP for verification of theProGW ’s claimed T (R). The RP verifies the claim
and replies to SmGW with verification results accordingly.
If the T (R) is legitimate and not being used, the SmGW replies with a TGPmessage
to the potential ProGW and it will be allowed to submit its bids in the auction board.
Otherwise, it will be denied access and the T (R) will be discarded. These processes
are used to prove ProGW j ’s identity and ownership over T (R j ). Unique values (Okey
and Nonce) also prevents adversaries from spoofing ProGW j ’s identity. 	
6 Testing and evaluation
This section presents an experimental analysis of our model. The resilience of the
proposed model is tested and assessed against double spending attacks on the basis
of partial progress towards block production, which is driven by time advantage and
average computing power. In addition, a simulation-based analysis and comparison of
the proposed model was carried out to determine the level of performance of our smart
contract based on its computational overhead and latency of transactions compared to
other existing models. The smart contract of our proposed scheme was deployed on
the virtual blockchain. The contract deployment transaction details is also available in
Etherscan: https://rinkeby.etherscan.io, and the deployment results/details is provided
in Fig. 5 which include the gas consumption and transaction cost of the contract
deployment.
The proposed model was implemented using Solidity Language. Experiments were
conducted using theMetamask [33] Ethereumwallet and chrome plugin. The proposed
model is design on the basis of PoA consensus algorithm, as a result PoA based
Rinkeby testnet [34] was used to alternatively mimic the blockchains ledger and the
testing network.Using this testnet, the real-world situation can be replicated efficiently.
Performance comparison of the proposed solution is provided against Aitzhan et al. [4]
and Dorri et al. [13], and they were implemented using the same setup scenario to have
better observations and readings of the experiment.
During the implementation of the smart contract, the smart gateways are repre-
sented as mappings from the Ethereum address of the nodes to objects containing
information about the participating entities. The Ethereum address of the contract
owner (manager) was initialized during smart contract deployment. The owner holds
the highest authority (private network administration) and has access to all features of
the framework. Furthermore, we registered and mapped thirty (30) different Ethereum
addresses to characterize smart home gateways (ProGW and ReqGW ) in the sys-
tem, which are later allowed to interact with each other in the SMP. MetaMask is
switched to the appropriate Ethereum account each time ProGW wants to make ten-
der submission or ReqGW wants to perform trading. Events with enough information
were conducted to observe the performance of each process. Several scenarios had
been checked to verify the logic of the smart contract code. The proposed smart
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Fig. 5 Smart contract deployment results
contract was analyzed using the Oyente smart contract security analysis tool [35].
Results show that the smart contract is free from established security vulnerabilities
[36] such Reentrancy, Timestamp dependence, Transaction dependency, and Parity
multisig bug with 53% EVM Code Coverage. The codes of this work is available in
GitHub repository (https://github.com/sysbel07/Multi-Commodity-Trading-scheme-
with-many-smart-marketplace-SMP-participants) for public usage.
The following subsections provide performance evaluation of the proposed model
in terms of resilience against double spending attack, computational overhead and
transaction latency. The double spending attack evaluation process involves testing the
system’s likelihood towards the attack. The evaluation was based on partial progress
towards block production in the blockchain [14]. The computational overhead evalu-
ation is based on execution gas and transaction gas consumed by the system during
function call operations. The execution gas is defined as the metric for measuring the
cost for smart contract implementation. Whereas the transaction gas includes the cost
of implementing and adding the contract to the blockchain. The transaction latency is
another parameter used in the evaluation, it is usually described as the measure of how
long transaction messages take. The parameters are based on the average or percentile
of the latency over a sample number of transaction messages [37].
6.1 Double spending attackmitigation evaluation
This section outlines experimental findings obtained following the launch of token and
ownership based double spending attacks on the proposed SMP network. The exper-
iment was implemented using Python 3 programming language. The experimental
results presented in this section are compared against the benchmark techniques. The
recorded number of blocks during our SMP implementations and their generation
times where used as our inputs to this experiment.
Similar arbitrary time advantages (from0 to 100 s)were used for all the test subjects.
Our results show that the likelihood of a double-spending attack increases with an
increase in the time benefit or the power of the adversary. Also, it can be observed
from Fig. 6a–e that double-spending attacks are very rare if there is a limited time
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Fig. 6 Double spending attack mitigation evaluation
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Fig. 7 Computational overhead and transaction latency. a Average transaction cost of the frameworks. b
Average execution cost of the frameworks. c Average transaction latency of the frameworks
advantage to the adversary. The above situations might be as a result of representing
the possibility of a double spending attack as the likelihood of a time disadvantage of
t seconds before a K +1 block is mined multiply by the likelihood of keeping up with
that disadvantage.
However, from Fig. 6d and e, our proposed model proves to be promising even with
40–50% of the computing power belongs to the adversary. This is due to the various
non-repeated sessional IDs used based on Bitmessage techniques and the ability of
our PHSC to track every single token spent during each transaction. Moreover, to
provide a detailed understanding of how the double spending behaves, the graphs are
presented under five separate scenarios, namely q = 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%
as shown in Fig. 6a–e respectively.
The experiment revealed that both [4,13] are not completely successful in address-
ing double spending attacks (Fig. 6a–e). The major advantage of the proposed SMRT
model is that it provides a OTMMRT facility and also manage to reduce the risk of
double spending attacks.
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6.2 Computational overhead and transaction latency
Practically, once an Ethereum blockchain transaction is made, Ethers are charged
as gas. In Ethereum, the computational overhead is measured based on the amount
of gas consumption by a system [37]. In this model, we simulated several potential
OTMMRT scenarios, and compared the results of the proposed SMRT model with
the benchmark models [4,13]. The transaction and execution gas consumption are
shown in Fig. 7a and b for the overall system operations, respectively. These results
show that gas consumption in SMRT is least effected by the increase in the number
of participants in SMP compared to existing schemes. It is because we avoid the use
of clustering algorithm that involves more computations in the development of smart
contracts; since using these practice creates more and unnecessary gas consumption
in the system [37].
Additionally, the transaction latency of our proposed system is recorded, measured,
and compared to that of benchmark works. Transaction latency in our approach was
measured using a background timer application that runs during transaction execution.
Time is measured based on the system processor clock and depends on the current
processor schedule. It is observed from Fig. 7c that our proposed model shows less
transaction latency as the number of participants increases in the SMP as compared to
[4,13]. This is consistent with the fact that the overall block time for validation is less
than 8 s in our framework according to Etherscan.While validation of a message block
in both [4,13] takes approximately up to 15 s. In addition, techniques [4,13] appear to
be more pronounced than our approach. This was because the techniques drive their
prevalence by depending on a central or semi-centric controller using PoW consensus
mechanism, reuse of keys/IDs and broad encryption/decryption processes. While in
our proposed approach, the PoA chains are maintained by trusted parties, keys/IDs
are sessional and the process uses a speed-up encryption/decryption mechanism.
7 Conclusion
The study proposed a blockchain-based semi-decentralized multi-resource trading
model named SMRT. Multiple scenarios were created to gauge the feasibility of mul-
tiple parallel trading interactions. An adversary model was developed to quantify the
effect of double spending attack on the proposed model. Our findings indicate that
double spending attack becomes a significant risk once an adversary has ample time
advantage towards bogus block production with adequate computing power. Besides,
SMRT demonstrates to be more promising in OTMMRT trading scenarios and at the
same time deals with double spending attack at a low computational cost and has
minimal transaction latency as compared to the benchmark techniques. Compared to
the existing trading models, it has been noted that SMRT not only provides protec-
tion against double spending attacks, but also offers a reduction of up to 50% in its
computational overhead.
Due to the transparency of blockchain, participants may be subject to the disclo-
sure of confidential information, such as the identity of the participant and details of
transactions carried out during trading process. As a result, ensuring the privacy of
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participants becomes a challenging task in most blockchain-based trading models. In
the future, we intend to propose a model to address issues related to privacy of the
participant in a blockchain-based trading model.
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